


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14 June 2011

Has Dennett gotten it right?



I just finished the first draft of a paper on Daniel Dennett's so-called heterophenomenology; actually against it. It bears the title "Phenomenological Skillful-Coping: Another Counter-Argument to Dennett's Heterophenomenology" and I go on to explain the gist of Dennett's heterophenomenology in order to criticize it from the point of view of European phenomenology. As everybody knows, with heterophenomenology Dennett attempts to provide a neutral method accounting for people's utmost subjective experiences, what Dennett persistently calls their 'own phenomenologies'. He has described heterophenomenology as "the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science" (*Consciousness Explained*).

I really don't want to get into technicalities. Suffice it to say that there's nothing easier than weeding out Dennett's interpretation of phenomenology as introspection because –as Dan Zahavi has consistently pointed out— "all the major figures in the phenomenological tradition have openly and unequivocally denied that they are engaged in some kind of introspective psychology and that the method they employ is a method of introspection" (for example, Husserl, Heidegger, Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty in several passages). Moreover, introspection is actually antiphénoménologique from the outset for the very point of departure of phenomenology in Husserl's breakthrough work, *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900-1901), was precisely a call to abandon the dichotomy (*Scheidung*) between inner and outer perceptions, which Husserl associated with a naïve commonsensical metaphysics left behind with the concept of intentionality. And of course, introspection is parasitic of this *Scheidung* which endorses the idea that consciousness is somewhat inside the head and the world outside.

So when for example Thomas Metzinger, following Dennett, affirms (cf. *Being No One*, 2003) phenomenology is so absurd for it must clumsily settle conflicting statements such as the following: "This is the purest blue anyone can perceive!" versus "No, it *isn't*, it has a faint but perceptible trace of green in it!" or, "This conscious experience of jealousy shows me how much I love my husband!" versus "No, this emotional state is not love *at all*, it is a neurotic, bourgeois fear of loss!"... well, then we laugh with scorn. By 'we' I mean, of course, the ones acquainted with the phenomenological tradition.

I must admit I don't agree with Dennett in almost anything, but I have learned a great deal reading his books (but not really from *Breaking the Spell*), and I have had a lot of fun reading him because, you know, he's very imaginative and a great writer. But it's so disturbing how he's influenced some people who have bought the idea that phenomenology is some sort of "introspectionist bit of mental gymnastics" (cf. *The Intentional Stance*, 1987). So all of a sudden, I have to be clarifying some folks that my research being carried out under the auspices of the *German Society for Phenomenological Research* in Würzburg has nothing to do with observing my inner thoughts closely or anything.

In Dennett's exchange with David Carr (1994), a Husserl scholar who has translated *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* into English and who has been blurting out Dennett's ignorance of phenomenology, we read: "Part of what I thought I learned from those early encounters is that reading the self-styled Husserlians was largely a waste of time; they were deeply into obscurantism for its own sake". Although Dennett has admitted he is not, strictly speaking, acquainted scholarly with the phenomenological tradition nor has kept up with the relevant literature ("If I can figure out at least most of it without having to subject myself to all that stuff, why should I bother raking through it for further good bits? Life is short"), he has quickly disregarded any accusation as to whether he has been involved in the suspicious attitude of bad reading habits and prejudice: "It is precisely because my disregard has *not* been complete that it has been, and continues to be, so confident". This is really puzzling, to say the least.

Now that I find out there's a category on this blog on the "analytic-continental divide and its overcoming", I ask myself if just reading, plain reading, that is, being acquainted with the tradition one supposedly is against, would help a bit in that direction of overcoming divides. Perhaps this shows that much of the discursive work that is to be found in philosophical journals (a percentage which I cannot wholly determine, but it must be huge) has to delay in basic explanations to sort out fundamental misunderstandings, because philosophers tend to criticize authors they simply have not read and whose work they ignore.

Well, I just wanted to say that I find this very disturbing.

.....

ADDENDUM. Here's the draft of my paper. Comments and criticisms are more than welcome!

Abstract. This paper deals with Daniel Dennett's well-known charges against phenomenological philosophy as an endeavour to restore the rights of introspection: that is, the attempt, albeit doomed to failure, to contribute to the science of the mind from a purported incorrigible, ineffable and 'subjective' (interpreted as 'private') first-person perspective. According to Dennett's heterophenomenology, only a strict third-person method is possible when it comes to the scientific study of the mind.

I will dispute Dennett's method in order to do both: correct Dennett's caricaturization of phenomenological philosophy as naïve introspection and offer not only a clarification of phenomenology's true aims and scope, but also a case in which phenomenology will stand as a crucial option in the new studies of the mind, under the sign of fresh air that can be found in the new approaches to cognitive science (the so called 4EA approaches: embodied, embedded, extended, enacted, affective). By way of introducing the 'phenomenological skillful-coping concept' to affirmatively respond to Dennett's own question: "Is there anything about experience that is not explorable by heterophenomenology? I'd like to know what", the answer should be firm: Yes there is! No less than the most basic non-theoretical, non-representational, embodied and embedded, human experience or coping.

Posted by Jethro Masis on 14 June 2011 at 20:19 in Analytic - Continental divide (and its overcoming), Jethro Masis, Phenomenology, Philosophy of Mind | Permalink

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Comments

1



Jon Cogburn dijo...

I agree wholeheartedly and would love to read your paper.

If I remember right, Paul Churchland's otherwise excellent *Matter and Consciousness* is even worse in this very regard. The idea that if Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Ponty had just read Freud or studied recent psychology papers on tacit knowledge (psychologists mean something very different by this than philosophers of language of a certain era) they would have gone and done something else is just incredibly ridiculous. But it seems to be presupposed by this kind of mocking of phenomenology. (I actually find Sartre's critique of Freud way more compelling than I think anyone I've ever met, but that's another issue).

One of the really nice things about philosophizing now is that with so much great contemporary work on phenomenology and cognitive science (as well as related Dreyfusiana) it's just much easier for analytic philosophers of mind and language in our generation to be able to avail themselves of the phenomenological tradition. As with any great philosopher (maybe only excepting Hume and Schopenhauer), the learning curves for Husserl or Heidegger is pretty steep if you just go read the originals without having the right kind of background. So I can see why people in Dennett's generation just weren't able to do it (not that this excuses obnoxious comments). But nobody has that excuse now I think.

Responder 14 June 2011 at 22:04

2



Dan Kervick dijo...

Speaking as someone from the analytic side of the old analytic-continental divide, I would personally have found phenomenology more amenable to my own thinking if its practitioners *were* more inclined to see their field as introspective psychology, whose object of study consists in patterns of contingent, empirically observed phenomena. I preferred Brentano, for example, to Husserl, and much preferred both Husserl and Brentano to Heidegger. I also tended to think that what was true and interesting and valuable in phenomenology, at least from my limited reading of it, was that the phenomenologists were introspective psychologists despite themselves, and despite their efforts to distance their field from empirical concerns, and elevate their study to a more metaphysicalized plane with grave talk of essences, Dasein, reductions, irreducible intentionality, being-in-the-world etc.

This is an old tension. I have had a similar response to Spinoza. Spinoza says a lot of interesting and insightful things about our emotional lives, gleaned I would assume from subjective observation of his own emotional experiences and third-person observation of what we take to be the behavior manifestations or constituents of the same experiences in others. However, he places those observations in a metaphysical setting that posits absolutely necessary connections and conceptual dependency between phenomena that appear to more empirically minded philosophers as nothing but general and contingent patterns, with no necessary connections among the constituents of the patterns. I personally don't think Spinoza has a sound basis for the additional metaphysical accretions. Nevertheless, I suppose the accretions are attractive for those of us who attracted to metaphysical systems as a certain kind of artwork. Musing on Spinozistic metaphysics is fun, even for people who don't think there is much in it that is true.

I am also skeptical of the potential of Dennettian heterophenomenology to fully capture subjectivity. My overall outlook is skeptical, which means in this area that I try to take the phenomena, such as I am able to understand them, at face value, and don't repudiate the phenomena if I don't understand how to integrate them into this or that theory, or the available scientific substrates of the moment. It seems to me there is such a thing as subjectivity; that we don't know much about the ultimate basis of subjective experience; that it comes with the territory in attempting to address subjective and non-public experience that these experiences are only tractable with difficulty by the public and objective methods of the physical sciences, and by natural languages designed primarily to communicate about publicly available phenomena. As a result, we either don't try to address subjectivity at all, or we find ourselves engaging in potentially embarrassing but still somehow meaningful discussions of the truest blue or the moods, feelings and anxieties produced by reading our favorite poets. That's tough that we aren't able to smoothly integrate and situate these phenomena among either our favorite and best-confirmed objective theories and models, or even among themselves. The world as we find it is confusing and humiliating in that way.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 00:00

3



Jon Cogburn dijo...

Man, I've got to think this through more. I somehow find myself agreeing with you (with the exception of the dig at Heidegger) and Jethro.

I think maybe Fransesco Varela and his group have managed to split the difference somewhat. His "naturalized phenomenology" explicitly resuscitated introspectionist techniques in a way that passed the strictest empirical muster. If I remember right nobody took the results of introspection to be non-revisable, and there was actual research into what made introspections more or less reliable. I think Varela had something to do with the remarkable results from brain scans of people as they entered deep meditative states.

It's really philosophically interesting, because the communities of nuns and buddhist monks have a good idea of who the best meditators are, and the brain scans have shown that these people are able to reliably lower the electrical activity in the part of the brain correlated with proprioception. So the introspective claim to experience the falling away of separation with the world has been subject to a pretty striking verification.

I don't know what the recent work in this area is, and how it's tied into more recent work at the intersection of phenomenology more generally (construed broadly enough to include early Heidegger) and cognitive science. Protevi should probably chime in.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 00:50

4



John Protevi dijo en respuesta a Jon Cogburn...

Protevi's on vacation, but briefly, for Husserl, the accent in the phrase "transcendental phenomenology" has to be equal on both terms. So insofar as phenomenology is transcendental, that is, involved in the search for the universal and necessary or a priori structures of subjectivity, it has nothing to do with psychological introspection, any more than Kant's CPR was psychological introspection.

Things are more complicated with Varela's neurophenomenology, the brain scans on meditators, and so on. Not mention what happens with Deleuze and "transcendental empiricism." But the Husserlians will insist on the points made in the first paragraph.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 03:10

5



Jethro Masis dijo...

The problem with naturalizing phenomenology is that with it you just end up distorting phenomenology as a whole and, even worse, experience itself! This is why I have attempted (with Dreyfus' skillful coping concept) to affirmatively respond to Dennett's own question: "Is there anything about experience that is not explorable by heterophenomenology? I'd like to know what". Well, yes there is! No less than the most basic non-theoretical, non-representational, embodied and embedded, human experience or coping. Nothing less than experience itself, Mr. Dennett!

John Protevi is right in the transcendental stance of phenomenology. It has to do with the fact that phenomenology understands itself not only contributing to the growth of scientific knowledge and its positive results, because first and foremost it is interested, as a *philosophical* endeavour, in the basis of human knowledge and its conditions of possibility. So, from a phenomenological standpoint, even science cannot be taken for granted; even science gets to be phenomenologically questioned. So Jon Cogburn is right that Dreyfus comes in pretty handy on these regards because he has demonstrated for years how absurd is to conceive of the world as a collection of objects or objective processes (this, of course, in the vain efforts of AI of creating artificial worlds by precisely ignoring the world *tout court!*). But again, apparently Dreyfus is nuts; and this comes from a group of researchers trying to program intelligence by getting rid of meaning.

So there's no mystery here. Phenomenology does not take objectivity for granted, because objectivity is everything but 'natural'. It is rather a by-product of certain historical experiences, above all, of intentionality. For phenomenology, phenomena signal a basic dimension of experience which is vertical, non-objectifiable and eventual. So a difference between *Faktizität* and *Tatsächlichkeit* lies at the heart of this dispute.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 04:54

6



Jon Cogburn dijo en respuesta a John Protevi...

Yeah, I really hope I can get clearer on the Deleuzian input on just this issue in the next few years. I've got to reread your piece in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science for starters (and get lunch with you and Jeff next time he's in town or we're in Hammond; I was sick last time).

Responder 15 June 2011 at 07:27

7



dmf dijo...

<http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2011/06/15/dennett-an-phenomenology/>

Responder 15 June 2011 at 07:35

8



Jeff Bell dijo...

Thanks for this. I'm in the middle of Zion National Park at the moment and it's in my mind a great place to do anything but engage in introspection and come to see why Husserl's dictum for phenomenology was "to the things themselves". In short, I agree with you: Dennett has gotten it wrong. You also bring up a good point about what you might call an ethics of reading.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 07:46

9



Eric Schliesser dijo en respuesta a John Protevi...

1. But in so far as it is transcendental is it really 'naturalistic' (as usually understood these days)? Phenomenologists often want it both ways; I don't have citations ready-to-hand [I apologize if this is inappropriate], but I read Zahavi as playing down the transcendental features when engaging an analytic audience (this was my impression when he visited Syracuse a few years ago).

2. Granted that phenomenology does not rely on introspection, it does seem to rely on some (difficult to characterize) *insight* by the phenomenologist, and it is this (in addition to terminological difficulty) that makes it problematic to outsiders, I suspect.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 08:27

10



Jethro Masis dijo en respuesta a dmf...

Thank you very much for this reply. I actually agree with you on Husserl's idealism. No wonder I'm quoting, for example, Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* instead of, say, *Ideen*. The subsequent history of phenomenology can be seen in fact as a coming to grips with Husserl's idealism, Heidegger accusing him of actually not going to the things themselves but relapsing on traditional Cartesian metaphysics.

But Husserl's contribution, so far as I can see, is having understood that the life-world, in which the real gestates itself as meaningfulness, possesses a heterogeneous texture with regard to mere objectivity. The dimension of intentional acts is constituted by a sort of vertical non-objectifiable dimension, because they are exerted, realized, carried out. So worldly experience cannot be objectified because meaningfulness can be characterized by its not being able to be contemplated, but by being an *Erlebnis*.

But anyway, I must admit my paper, which drove me into writing this post, is more Heideggerian than Husserlian.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 08:38

11



Eric B dijo en respuesta a Eric Schliesser...

Regarding your #2: Do you think this reliance on "insight" is different than the use of "intuitions" at points in arguments by analytic philosophers?

It seems like there might be a general phenomenon here. Big conjecture: I might characterize what I think you're pointing out by the fact that at some point our arguments and descriptions can't get much more articulated, fine-grained, and, simultaneously, evaluable in terms of publicly characterizable factors (to be very broad). So, at that point, either I get your insight or glom onto the train of thought that hangs on your intuition, or I don't. (I don't think this warrants any sort of strong [e.g., dismissive or "nihilistic"] skepticism about human reason, since it can be a long time before we end up invoking intuitions or insights in this role, if we're working hard enough at reasoning together.)

Responder 15 June 2011 at 08:46

12



Eric Schliesser dijo en respuesta a Eric B...

I like your big conjecture.

On intuitions...that's a useful comparison. What's crucial, in my view, is to what degree insights and intuitions may be challenged, revised, and re-interpreted (etc) during (shared?) philosophic exploration.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 08:57

13



dmf dijo en respuesta a Jethro Masis...

jm, I'm not the good dr but I agree with much of what he said so I added the comment/link, the Husserl/Heidegger tension is the central one here and the cause of much of the animus aimed at Dreyfus and his students.

*I'm with Eric that "Granted that phenomenology does not rely on introspection, it does seem to rely on some (difficult to characterize) *insight* by the phenomenologist, and it is this (in addition to terminological difficulty) that makes it problematic to outsiders, I suspect." except that I feel this tension even as an insider (tho of a post-pheno Don Ihde like strain these days) and think this is related to some of Jeff Bell's work, here and elsewhere, on concepts/events.*

Responder 15 June 2011 at 08:57

14



Jethro Masis dijo...

I guess it's better if I just circulate my draft. So HERE it is.

*I don't think this "insight" by the phenomenologist is anything mysterious. It's got to be evident, public and intersubjective. My way of interpreting Husserl's *Prinzip aller Prinzipien* is this: Nothing can be made up! It cannot be a mere belief as it is actually Dennett's belief that belief is the first stance by means of which one can tackle experience.*

Responder 15 June 2011 at 09:03

15



msa dijo...

It's true that phenomenology can't be understood as a kind of simple "introspection" where we simply look inside ourselves to find our "most private and ineffable subjective

experiences" as Dennett claims. But all of the key concepts of thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and others are derived from attending to our own experience. The notions of intentionality, Da-sein and disclosedness, the body-subject, the for-itself and in-itself, all of these were derived by the phenomenologists by paying close attention to their own experience and suspending any beliefs about the existence of anything other than their own experience. So if the phenomenological method isn't the kind of thing that Dennett and others take it to be, a kind of descriptive psychology, still it is another, perhaps more sophisticated form of introspection, which yields truths about the human condition, rather than simply telling us how a specific person with a purely individual psychology perceives the world.

But despite the advantage of phenomenological philosophy over simple introspection, it still falls squarely on the idealism side of the idealism/realism dispute.

Responder 15 June 2011 at 10:44

16



Jethro Masis dijo en respuesta a Jeff Bell...

*That's right Jeff, I had in mind an ethics of reading as well. But it seems the burden of tradition is sometimes too strong. So if ones thinks everything is a thesis, either idealism or realism, either objectivism or subjectivism, precisely with the phenomenological tradition which has cared to investigate the very thetic act, it turns out pretty hard to communicate anything. Some famous words about philosophical discussions from *What is Philosophy?* by Deleuze and Guattari come to mind: "The best one can say about discussions is that they take things no farther, since the participants never talk about the same thing."*

Responder 15 June 2011 at 15:54

17



dmf dijo en respuesta a Eric B...

like seeing-aspects, or not, in Wittgenstein and picked up by Rorty in his public/private split, or from another lineage on the limits of conversation/debate in Bifo's book on Guatarri/Deleuze?

Responder 15 June 2011 at 17:38

18



Charles Wolfe dijo...

I don't think anyone outside the Varelian crew (and granted there are enormous philosophical differences in that volume between, picked at random, Barabas, Roy and Petitot) takes the naturalizing phenomenology project seriously, or else in a very matter of fact way; 'they have useful insights' but then it makes no difference to the philosophical core or positioning of whoever is discussing it. (That said to Jon.) And indeed it won't work with any naturalistic program however oecumenical (agreeing with Eric S). But taking on Dennett is a little facile / old by now, isn't it? After all there is not just Churchland and Dennett out there: there's an impressive paper by Ralph Ellis and John Bickle (Yes, THAT Bickle! the ruthless reductionist) on some aspects of phenomenology which is much less crude than what is described above. And after all, Menary, Sutton et al have left behind those analytic vs phenomenological debates ages ago... dunno what Catarina thinks about it. To say: the phenomenological tradition is deeper and richer than what Dennett makes of it... so? The cognitivist tradition is also deeper and richer than what Heidegger would have thought (or Charles Taylor). There is also the Jaakko Hintikka take on Husserl in an analytic vein. Etc....

Responder 17 June 2011 at 13:07

19



Jethro Masis dijo en respuesta a Charles Wolfe...

*I guess you're referring to "Phenomenology and Cortical Microstimulation" (In *Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind*, D. W. Smith & Thomasson, eds.).*

*Online there's a review by Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten of Bickle's *Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account*. See [HERE](#).*

Responder 17 June 2011 at 13:34

20



seth edenbaum dijo...

"all the major figures in the phenomenological tradition have openly and unequivocally denied that they are engaged in some kind of introspective psychology and that the method they employ is a method of introspection"

Claims of self-reporting or "original intent" aren't a valid starting point for debate. That is, unless you're Antonin Scalia.

And in "heterophenomenology" Dennett's renamed the wheel, titling what has always been the foundation of the humanities. But in his quest for a "science" we're back to attempts at the science of history and philosophy. It's vulgar Marxism and the "naturalist epistemology" of the Chicago school etc. all over again. The desperate attempt of rationalists to limit the sloppiness of the practice of empiricism. The claims of outsider status, based on fantasy.

Responder 17 June 2011 at 13:41

21



Francis Michael Palazzolo dijo...

If only there was a more inclusive Dennett writing philosophy instead of a Dennett trying to model consciousness. I'd love to read your paper JM, but when I tried the Keep&Share requires you, the writer to, assign viewing "rights."

Responder 18 June 2011 at 01:02

22



Jethro Masis dijo...

Hi Francis, and thank you for letting me know that! Try out [THIS VERSION](#).

Responder 18 June 2011 at 07:16

23



seth edenbaum dijo...

If we want to focus on the relation of perceptions to the world and do some justice to sense, the question is whether it's better to observe through invention, leaving your foundations unexamined (as fixations) or invent through observation, with ironic detachment in relation to our tastes. At one level it's a choice is between philosophy and history. In terms of literature it's choice between Lovecraft and Proust.

It's possible to refer to Hume as "minor" [quotes in the original] only because it's possible also to call his works anti-philosophical. He offers the best defense I've read by a philosopher of Aristophanes, Euripides or Shakespeare (I'm sure somewhere someone's made the argument that Hume is the philosopher of the British novel). That defense doubles as a defense of democracy, which as more than one philosopher has said is anti-philosophical. "Liberté, égalité, fraternité" is not democracy. A phrase isn't a system.

Philosophy descends from above, from authority. In modern terms, as vanguardism, the authority has been redefined, but it's still authority. I found this quote from Mill in a post written by a philosopher discussing [comic books](#)

"Speculative philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interests of men, is in reality the thing on earth which most influences them, and in the long run overbears every other influence save those which it must itself obey."

I cringed reading the post and the quote.

I haunt this blog because the "A" in the title stands for art, and someone here should defend the arts from philosophers. I also think it's important to defend democracy from the vanguard, but that's a bigger issue.

Responder 18 June 2011 at 10:24

24



j dijo...

one thing i don't understand is... why should be anybody subjecting himself to all that stuff, i mean dennet's stuff of course... "life is short", oder?

Responder 23 June 2011 at 07:42

25



Michael Drake dijo...

Okay, I'm going to close the italic tag. There - that should do it.

Responder 23 June 2011 at 08:48

26



Michael Drake dijo...

"all the major figures in the phenomenological tradition have openly and unequivocally denied that they are engaged in some kind of introspective psychology and that the method they employ is a method of introspection...."

Is the accent here on "psychology" or on "introspection"? (Or is it on "method"?) Here is the definition of phenomenology at the [SEP](#):

The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of "phenomena": appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong action), etc.

This appears to describe a process of introspection, one presumes using some sort of distinctive method. And if it's not "psychology," it obviously has a strong psychological component. Is SEP wrong? What am I missing?

Responder 23 June 2011 at 08:55

27



hjjh dijo...

i am sure that none of the "major figures in the phenomenological tradition" wrote the SEC entry, but anyway it is of course easier to check the definition in a dictionary or encyclopedia, than reading e.g. husserl or heidegger,... it seems to me that, at the end, dennet's discussion on what he calls 'phenomenology' has less to do with actual phenomenology as that nonsense-interchange between dreyfus & searle...

Responder 24 June 2011 at 05:59

28



Eric Schliesser dijo en respuesta a hjjh...

Sure, we should not rely on encyclopedias alone. But Drake is asking an honest question (and David Woodruff Smith is a leading scholar), and your response is not constructive. (See also my comment 9 above.)

Responder 24 June 2011 at 06:59

29



Michael Drake dijo...

"i am sure that none of the "major figures in the phenomenological tradition" wrote the SEC entry...."

Nor were any of them the source of the quoted claim I was inquiring after.

Responder 24 June 2011 at 09:13

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